Yutaka Suzuki

Professor of Economics, Hosei University, Japan

2001.4-02.3 Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Stanford University
2002.4-03.3 Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Harvard University

2011.9-12.8 Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics, Harvard University

Email: yutaka at hosei ac jp

Hosei  Researchers Information   http://kenkyu-web.i.hosei.ac.jp/Profiles/15/0001407/profile.html


Education

University of Tokyo, B.A. Economics 1986-1990 with "Ouchi Hyoue Prize" for B.A. Thesis.

University of Tokyo, Doctoral Program in Economics, 1990.4-1995.3

M.A. in Economics 1993.3,

Ph.D. in Economics 1999.2,

Essays on Competition, Collusion and Organization Design: An Approach from Information, Contract and Organization Theory (160 pages).

Thesis Committee Members:

M.Okuno-Fujiwara (Chair), M.Kandori, H.Matsushima, A.Matsui, and N.Yanagawa


Research Interests

 Contract Theory, Theoretical Industrial Organization, Theory of the Firm, Theoretical Institutional Analysis


Publications in English


1
."Competition through Endogenized Tournaments: An Interpretation of 'Face-to-Face' Competition." (with H.Konishi and M.Okuno-Fujiwara), lead article in Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 10.199-232.(1996)
2."Integration vs. Non Integration, Specific Investments, and Ex Post Resource Distribution", International Economic Journal 19.11-35. (2005)
3."An Incomplete Contract Approach to Vertically Integrated Multi-National Enterprises: A Hartian Modeling with Monotone Comparative Statics." lead article in Chinese Journal of Economic Theory 1.219-244 (2004)
4."Dumping Behavior and Anti-Dumping Laws in International Duopoly: A Note on Infinite Horizon Formulation", Journal of Economic Research 10.pp305-324 (2005) Link
5.
"Equilibrium Incentives and Accumulation of Relational Skills in a Dynamic Model of Hold up," Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 no. 7 pp.1-11 (2006) Link
6. "Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes and Relational Contracts in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard", Journal of International Economic Studies (2007) Vol.21, 103-124.Link
7."Collusion in Organizations and Management of Conflicts through Job Design and Authority Delegation", Journal of Economic Research 12. pp 203-241 (2007) Link
8."Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4 no. 12 pp. 1-10 (2008) Link.
9.“A Comparative Theory of Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized Firm”, Journal of International Economic Studies Vol.25 pp.3-28 (2011) Special Issue. Link
10.“A Three-Tier Agency Model with Collusive Auditing: Two-Type Case”, Journal of International Economic Studies Vol.25 pp.29-48 (2011) Special Issue.Link
11.“An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance” ― Commitment vs. Flexibility  ―(with Y. Tsuranuki), International Economic Journal 31.297-309. (2017)


Books in Japanese

1.『完全理解 ゲーム理論・契約理論 勁草書房 2016/09 keisoshobo amazon rakuten (English Title : Game Theory and Contract Theory)
2.『ガバナンスの比較セクター分析:ゲーム理論・契約理論を用いた学際的アプローチ』(編著)法政大学比較経済研究所研究シリーズNo.25法政大学出版局 2010/03 kinokuniya bk1 amazon neowing ( English Title : Cross-Sectoral Comparative Analysis of Governance: A Game/Contract Theoretical Approach )
3.『ズバリ図解 ゲーム理論』(監修)ぶんか社文庫 2008/10 amazon

Chapter in Book/Paper in Japanese etc


1."Thinking of ‘Corporate Governance in Japanese Firms’ in Game Theory", in M. Nakayama, S. Muto, and Y. Funaki, eds., Thinking in Game Theory (
ゲーム理論で解く) (2000), Yuhikaku Publishing Co.,Ltd.(有斐閣) in Japanese
amazon
2."An Incomplete Contract (Asset Ownership) Approach to 1. Privatization of Chinese State Enterprises and 2.Emergence of  Vertically Integrated Multinational Enterprises (VMNEs) ", 中国研究月報Monthly Journal of Chinese Affairs)Vol 60. No.7. pp29-44 (2006) Institute of Chinese Affairs, in Japanese, Link
3."Innovation Management: An Incomplete Contract Analysis (イノベーションマネジメント:不完備契約分析)" in 『国際競争力を高める企業の直接投資戦略と貿易』(田村晶子編)日本評論社 第1章 pp 9-34, 2017年3月 in Japanese.

Publications in Hosei University's Bulletin

  1. "Capital Accumulation through ‘Controlled Competition’: Two Stage Tournaments as a Strategy for Firm Growth". Hosei Economic Review(『経済志林』) (1996) Vol.63, No.3, pp39-80. in Japanese. Link
  2. "Commitment and Renegotiation in Procurement Relationships: Towards a Theory of 'Rules vs. Discretion'." Hosei Economic Review(『経済志林』) (1998) Vol.66,No.1, pp311-338. in Japanese.
  3. “Commitment Problem and Optimal Incentive Schemes in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard” Hosei Economic Review (『経済志林』)(1998) Vol.66, No1, pp 339-358. in English..
  4. “Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy: The Points of the Literature on "the Interaction between Industrial Organization and Corporate Finance" and a Note toward Future Modeling” Hosei Economic Review(『経済志林』) (2000) Vol.67, No.3.4. pp243-264. in Japanese.
  5. "An Incomplete Contract Approach to 'Vertically Integrated Multinational Enterprises (VMNEs)' " Hosei Economic Review (『経済志林』)(2000) Vol.68, No.1, pp371-391. in Japanese.
  6. Round table: Mori Kahei Prize Award 2010: on "Shugochi no Keiei: Nihon Kigyo no Chisiki Kanri Senryaku (management of collective knowledge: knowledge management strategy of Japanese firm)" by Haruo Horaguti  [in Japanese] Horaguchi Haruo, Koike Kazuo, Suzuki Yutaka, Kondo Akio, Hagiwara Susumu (moderator), Hosei Economic Review (『経済志林』)(2010) Vol. 78(1), pp 51-121
  7. Book Review: Peace and Security by Motoshi Suzuki (University of Tokyo Press 2007, Mori Kahei Award Winner 2012), Hosei Economic Review (『経済志林』)(2013) Vol. 80(3) pp 309-326


Working Papers (in English/Japanese)

  1. "Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Organizations" Abstract (Chapter 1 of my Doctoral Thesis)A Related,Theoretical Note (Working Paper 8) (2006)
  2. "Capital Accumulation through 'Controlled Competition': Two Stage Tournaments as a strategy for Firm Growth." Revised under the title of "Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations" PDF (Original version Chapter 3 of my Doctoral Thesis) 日本語の初版:比較研ワーキングペーパーNo.46(1995年)
  3. "Dumping Behavior and Anti-Dumping Laws in an Infinite Horizon International Duopoly Model" Abstract A Theoretical Note (2005)
  4. "Monotonicity of Optimal solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games" Link → An Application to Dynamic Holdup (2006)
  5. "Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized Firm: Management of Externalities vs. Private Benefits" PDF
  6. "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Turnpike Property, and Existence of Forecast Horizon in a Dynamic Model of Hold up".
  7. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types." (A Longer Version) Link
  8. "Mechanism Design with Collusive Auditing : A Three-Tier Agency Model with "Monotone Comparative Statics" and an Implication for Corporate Governance" 比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー No.128 Link
  9. "Collusive Supervision and Ex-ante vs. Ex-post Contracting in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types" 2011 Feb.
  10. 「高齢者福祉民営化の可能性:不完備契約理論による分析」2008年7月
  11. 「欧州連合(EU)における集権・分権とインセンティブ問題:『契約理論』の視点(安定成長協定とユーロ圏財政ガバナンスを題材として)」(共著)2009年4月
  12. 「中国における中央・地方政府間財政関係と"包"および"比賽"の概念:『契約理論』による開発ガバナンスの分析」(共著)2009年6月

  13. "Collusive Supervision and Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types" Revised September 2012. Link
  14. "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of “Bao (Contract)” and “Bisai (Contest)”: A Contract Theory Analysis of Development Governance" Revised ICES Working Paper No.189 January 2015.Link
  15. "Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial Governance:A Contract Theory Analysis", December 2012, ICES Working Paper No.170. Revised.SSRN
  16. "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type,Three-tier Agency Framework", Revised 2013 SSRN
  17. "Collusion, Shading and Optimal Organization Design" 2014 June
  18. An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance”―“Commitment vs. Flexibility with Y. Tsuranuki, ICES Working Paper No.202, 2016 January


Presentations at International Conferences in English

2013 "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework" at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2013), Singapore, August 2-4, 2013

2012 "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2012), Delhi, India, Decemberr 20th to 22th, 2012

2012 "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at the international conference for “Institutions, Economic Growth and International Trade”, China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University, China, September 7th to 9th, 2012

2012 "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 15-19

2011 "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at 16th World Congress of the International Economics Association, July 4 - 8, 2011,Tsinghua University, Beijing

2011 "A Contract Theory Approach to Centralization, Decentralization and the Incentive Problem in the European Union (EU), with a focus on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Euro Zone Financial Governance" at 16th World Congress of the International Economics Association, July 4 - 8, 2011,Tsinghua University, Beijing

2010 "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 12-16

2009 "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design" at the 1st Annual UECE Lisbon Meetings: Game Theory and Applications, November 5-7, Lisbon, Portugal.

2008 “Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup”at the conference of the Society for Economic Design (SED), Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 15-17

2007“Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup” at Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting, Taipei, Taiwan, July 11-13

2007Collusion in Organizations and Management of Conflicts through Job Design and Authority Delegation ”at the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET07), July 6-8, Vanderbilt, USA.

2007“Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup”at the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET07), July 6-8, Vanderbilt, USA.

2006 "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Turnpike Property, and Existence of Forecast Horizon in a Dynamic Model of Hold up" at Econometric Society European Meeting, Austria, Vienna, August 24-28.

2006 "Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized Firm: Management of Externalities vs. Private Benefits" at Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting, Beijing, July 10-12.                                                                                                            

2006 "Managed Competition in Supply Relations: An Application of the Asset Ownership Approach" at Mid-West Economic Theory Meeting, April 28-30, Michigan State, US.

2003  "Commitment Problem,Optimal Incentive Schemes, and Relational Contracts in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard" at Econometric Society European Meeting, Stockholm, Sweden, August 20-24.

2003  "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games" at Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Vancouver, University of British Columbia,Canada, May 9-11.

2003  "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games" at Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting, Washington.DC., January 3-5. 2003

2002  "Incomplete Contracts, collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Organizations" at Mid-West Economic Theory Meeting, October 18-20, Notre Dame, USA.

2002  "Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes and Repeated Relationship in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard" at International Conference on Game Theory and Applications, Qingdao,China, August 14-17, 2002

2002  "Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 22-26, 2002

2002  "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games" at 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, St. Petersburg, Russia, July 8-11, 2002.

2002  "Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations" at Association for Public Economic Theory, PET 2002, Paris, July 4-6, 2002.

2001  "Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations" at South-East Economic Theory Meeting, November 16-18,Florida, Miami, USA.

2001  "Dumping Behavior and Anti-Dumping Laws in an Infinite Horizon International Duopoly Model" at Mid-West International Economics Meeting, October 19-21,Penn State,USA.

2000  "Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency" at First World Congress of The Game Theory Society (GAMES2000), July 24-28, Bilbao,Spain.

2000  "Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency" at Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting, Boston, January 7-9,2000.

1998  "Capital Accumulation through 'Controlled Competition': Two Stage Tournaments as a strategy for Firm Growth." at Econometric Society North America Summer Meeting 1998, Montreal, Canada, June 25-28.


Recent Research Interests and Work in Progress

Cross-Sectoral Comparative Analysis of Governance: A Contract & Game Theoretic Approach (Project Leader at Hosei Institute of Comparative Economic Studies)
A Comparative Theory of Non-Integrated, Integrated (Centralized) and Decentralized Firms

A Contract Theoretical Analysis on Modern China's Institutional Reform.
Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis
A Contract Theory Approach to Centralization, Decentralization and the Incentive Problem in the European Union (EU), with a focus on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Euro Zone Financial Governance
Contract & Game Theoretical Approach to Social Security Reform. HIA Discussion Paper No.12.『高齢者福祉民営化の可能性:不完備契約理論による分析』, in Japanese
"Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Turnpike Property, and Existence of Forecast Horizon in a Dynamic Model of Hold up". Revised version, September 2006
Dynamic Contracting, Recursive Methods for applying to and analyzing the economic problems, in some cases, with an additional consideration of 'Renegotiation, Renegotiation-proofness'


Professional Affiliations

Econometric Society, Japanese Economic Association


Referee

      International Economic Review, Japanese Economic Review, Journal of Economics, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Japanese Economic Studies (in Japanese), Keio Economic Studies, Review of International Economics, Theoretical Economics


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Last Updated, April 21, 2017