Yutaka Suzuki
Professor of
Economics, Hosei University, Japan
Email: yutaka at hosei ac jp
Hosei Researchers Information https://kenkyu-web.hosei.ac.jp/Profiles/15/0001407/profile.html
University of Tokyo, B.A. Economics 1986-1990 with "Ouchi Hyoue Prize" for B.A. Thesis.
University of Tokyo, Doctoral Program in Economics, 1990.4-1995.3
M.A. in Economics 1993.3,
Ph.D. in Economics 1999.2,
Essays on Competition, Collusion and Organization Design: An Approach from Information, Contract and Organization Theory (160 pages).
Thesis Committee Members:
M.Okuno-Fujiwara (Chair), M.Kandori, H.Matsushima, A.Matsui, and N.Yanagawa
Assistant Professor of Economics, Hosei University 1995/04/01-1996/03/31
Associate Professor of Economics, Hosei University 1996/04/01-2004/03/31
Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics,Stanford University 2001/04/01-2002/03/31
Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics,Harvard University 2002/04/01-2003/03/31
Professor of Economics, Hosei University 2004/04/01-Present
Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics,Harvard University 2011/09/01-2012/08/31
Dean, Graduate School of Economics, Hosei University 2013/04/01-2015/03/31
Dean, Faculty of Economics, Hosei University 2017/04/01-2021/03/31
Contract Theory, Theoretical Industrial Organization, Theory of the Firm, Theoretical Institutional Analysis
1."Competition
through Endogenized Tournaments: An Interpretation of 'Face-to-Face'
Competition." (with H.Konishi
and M.Okuno-Fujiwara), lead article in Journal of the Japanese and International
Economies 10.199-232.(1996)
2."Integration vs. Non Integration, Specific Investments, and Ex Post Resource
Distribution", International Economic Journal 19.11-35. (2005)
3."An Incomplete Contract Approach to
Vertically Integrated Multi-National Enterprises: A Hartian
Modeling with Monotone Comparative Statics."
lead article in Chinese Journal of Economic Theory 1.219-244 (2004)
4."Dumping Behavior and Anti-Dumping Laws in International
Duopoly: A Note on Infinite Horizon Formulation", Journal of Economic Research 10.pp305-324 (2005) Link
5. "Equilibrium Incentives and Accumulation of Relational Skills in a
Dynamic Model of Hold up," Economics Bulletin, Vol. 12 no. 7 pp.1-11 (2006) Link
6. "Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes and Relational Contracts
in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard", Journal of International Economic Studies (2007) Vol.21, 103-124.Link
7."Collusion in Organizations and Management of Conflicts through Job Design
and Authority Delegation", Journal of Economic Research 12. pp 203-241 (2007) Link
8."Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency
Model with a Continuum of Types," Economics Bulletin, Vol. 4 no. 12 pp. 1-10 (2008) Link.
9.“A
Comparative Theory of Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized
Firm”, Journal of International Economic
Studies Vol.25 pp.3-28 (2011) Special Issue. Link
10.“A
Three-Tier Agency Model with Collusive Auditing: Two-Type Case”, Journal of International Economic Studies Vol.25 pp.29-48 (2011) Special Issue.Link
11.“An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance” ― Commitment
vs. Flexibility ―(with Y. Tsuranuki), International Economic Journal 31.297-309. (2017) Eprint Link
12. “Centralization, Decentralization and Incentive Problems in Eurozone Financial
Governance: A Contract Theory Analysis”, International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol.10, No.3, March, 2018.
13. "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments:
A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework", Journal of Economic Research 23 (2018 ) 1-37 Lead Article.
14. “A Contract Theory Analysis to Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China”, Economic and Political Studies,Vol.7, Issue 3. 33 pages. (2019) Routledge /Taylor & Francis Eprint Link
15. "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design in a Three-tier
Agency Model with a Continuum of Types." Annals of Economics and Finance, Vol. 22 No. 2, 317-365, 2021/11/01.
16. "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design" The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol. 23, no. 2, 2023, pp. 537-575. De Gruyter. Link
1.『中国経済の制度分析：契約理論・ゲーム理論アプローチ』日本評論社 2020/01 nippyo rakuren amazon
2.『完全理解 ゲーム理論・契約理論』 勁草書房 2016/09 keisoshobo amazon rakuten (English Title : Game Theory and Contract Theory) 2018/03 重版（第2刷） 2021/08 第2版 keisoshobo amazon rakuten kinokuniya Cf. 【2022年版】契約理論のおすすめ本”5選”
3.『ガバナンスの比較セクター分析：ゲーム理論・契約理論を用いた学際的アプローチ』（編著）法政大学比較経済研究所研究シリーズNo.25法政大学出版局 2010/03 amazon rakuten bk1 neowing ( English Title : Cross-Sectoral Comparative Analysis of Governance: A
Game/Contract Theoretical Approach )
4.『ズバリ図解 ゲーム理論』（監修）ぶんか社文庫 2008/10 amazon
1."Thinking of ‘Corporate Governance in Japanese Firms’ in Game Theory",
in M. Nakayama, S. Muto, and Y. Funaki, eds., Thinking in Game Theory (『ゲーム理論で解く』) (2000), Yuhikaku Publishing Co.,Ltd.(有斐閣) in Japanese amazon
2."An Incomplete Contract (Asset Ownership) Approach to 1. Privatization of Chinese State Enterprises and 2.Emergence of Vertically Integrated
Multinational Enterprises (VMNEs) ", 『中国研究月報』（Monthly Journal of Chinese Affairs）Vol 60. No.7. pp29-44 (2006) Institute of Chinese Affairs, in
Japanese, Link
3."Innovation Management: An Incomplete Contract Analysis （イノベーションマネジメント：不完備契約分析）"
in 『国際競争力を高める企業の直接投資戦略と貿易』（田村晶子編）日本評論社 第１章 pp 9-34, 2017年3月 in Japanese.
Publications in Hosei University's Bulletin
「中国における中央・地方政府間財政関係と"包"および"比賽"の概念：『契約理論』による開発ガバナンスの分析」（共著）2009年6月
2023 “Controlled Competition”: Dynamic Tournaments as Economic Development Strategy: A Viewpoint from Incentive Design, at the Econometric Society European Meeting (ESEM 2023), Barcelona, August 28-31, 2023. (Link to the Session)
2023 “Controlled Competition”: Dynamic Tournaments as Economic Development
Strategy: A Viewpoint from Incentive Design, at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2023), Singapore, July 28-30, 2023.
=======================
2013 "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework" at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2013), Singapore, August 2-4, 2013
2012 "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2012), Delhi, India, Decemberr 20th to 22th, 2012
2012 "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at the international conference for “Institutions, Economic Growth and International Trade”, China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University, China, September 7th to 9th, 2012
2012 "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 15-19
2011 "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at 16th World Congress of the International Economic Association, July 4 - 8, 2011,Tsinghua University, Beijing
2011 "A Contract Theory Approach to Centralization, Decentralization and the Incentive Problem in the European Union (EU), with a focus on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Euro Zone Financial Governance" at 16th World Congress of the International Economic Association, July 4 - 8, 2011,Tsinghua University, Beijing
2010 "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 12-16.
2009 "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design" at the 1st Annual UECE Lisbon Meetings: Game Theory and Applications, November 5-7, Lisbon, Portugal.
2008 “Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup”at the conference of the Society for Economic Design (SED), Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 15-17
2007“Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup” at Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting, Taipei, Taiwan, July 11-13
2007“Collusion in Organizations and Management of Conflicts through Job Design and Authority Delegation ”at the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET07), July 6-8, Vanderbilt, USA.
2007“Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup”at the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET07), July 6-8, Vanderbilt, USA.
2006 "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Turnpike Property, and Existence of Forecast Horizon in a Dynamic Model of Hold up" at Econometric Society European Meeting, Austria, Vienna, August 24-28.
2006 "Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized Firm: Management of Externalities vs. Private Benefits" at Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting, Beijing, July 10-12.
2006 "Managed Competition in Supply Relations: An Application of the Asset Ownership Approach" at Mid-West Economic Theory Meeting, April 28-30, Michigan State, US.
2003 "Commitment Problem,Optimal Incentive Schemes, and Relational Contracts in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard" at Econometric Society European Meeting, Stockholm, Sweden, August 20-24.
2003 "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games" at Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Vancouver, University of British Columbia,Canada, May 9-11.
2003 "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games" at Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting, Washington.DC., January 3-5. 2003
2002 "Incomplete Contracts, collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Organizations" at Mid-West Economic Theory Meeting, October 18-20, Notre Dame, USA.
2002 "Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes and Repeated Relationship in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard" at International Conference on Game Theory and Applications, Qingdao,China, August 14-17, 2002
2002 "Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 22-26, 2002
2002 "Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games" at 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, St. Petersburg, Russia, July 8-11, 2002.
2002 "Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations" at Association for Public Economic Theory, PET 2002, Paris, July 4-6, 2002.
2001 "Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations" at South-East Economic Theory Meeting, November 16-18,Florida, Miami, USA.
2001 "Dumping Behavior and Anti-Dumping Laws in an Infinite Horizon International Duopoly Model" at Mid-West International Economics Meeting, October 19-21,Penn State,USA.
2000 "Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency" at First World Congress of The Game Theory Society (GAMES2000), July 24-28, Bilbao,Spain.
2000 "Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency" at Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting, Boston, January 7-9,2000.
1998 "Capital Accumulation through 'Controlled Competition': Two Stage Tournaments as a strategy for Firm Growth." at Econometric Society North America Summer Meeting 1998, Montreal, Canada, June 25-28.
Recent Research
Interests and Work in Progress
・A Contract Theoretical Analysis on Modern China's Institutional Reform.
・Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and
the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest":
A Contract Theory Analysis
・A Contract Theory Approach to Centralization, Decentralization and the
Incentive Problem in the European Union (EU), with a focus on the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) and Euro Zone Financial Governance
・Contract & Game Theoretical Approach to Social Security Reform. HIA Discussion Paper No.12.『高齢者福祉民営化の可能性：不完備契約理論による分析』, in Japanese
・"Monotonicity
of Optimal Solutions, Turnpike Property, and Existence of Forecast Horizon in a
Dynamic Model of Hold up". Revised version, September 2006
・Dynamic Contracting, Recursive Methods for applying to and analyzing the
economic problems, in some cases, with an additional consideration of 'Renegotiation,
Renegotiation-proofness'
Professional Affiliations
Econometric Society, Japanese Economic Association
International Economic Review, Japanese Economic Review, Journal of Economics, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Japanese Economic Studies (in Japanese), Keio Economic Studies, Review of International Economics, Theoretical Economics
Teaching: Click and See This Homepage!
Last Updated, September 3, 2023