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Yutaka Suzuki
Professor of Economics
Hosei University


 Presentations at Conferences in English

  1998
  2000
  • “Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency” at the Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting 2000, Boston, January 7-9. Program
  • “Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Agency” at the First World Congress of The Game Theory Society (GAMES2000), July 24-28, Bilbao, Spain.
  2001
  • “Dumping Behavior and Anti-Dumping Laws in an Infinite Horizon International Duopoly Model” at Mid-West International Economics Meeting, October 19-21, Penn State, USA.
  • “ Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations” at South-East Economic Theory Meeting, November 16-18, Florida, Miami, USA.
  2002
  • “ Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations” at the Association for Public Economic Theory, PET 2002, Paris, July 4-6 2002
  • “Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games” at 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications, St. Petersburg, Russia, July 8-11 2002
  • “ Managed Competition as an Incentive Mechanism in Supply Relations” at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 22-26, 2002
  • “Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes and Repeated Relationship in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard” at International Conference on Game Theory and Applications, Qingdao, China, August 14-17, 2002
  • “Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Hierarchical Organizations” at Mid-West Economic Theory Meeting, October 18-20, Notre Dame, USA.
  2003
  • “Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games” at the Econometric Society North American Winter Meeting, Washington D.C., USA, January 3-5. 2003
  • “Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions and Existence of Forecast Horizon in Dynamic Games” at Canadian Economic Theory Conference, Vancouver, University of British Columbia, Canada, May 9-11. 2003.
  • “Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes, and Relational Contracts in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard” at Econometric Society European Meeting, Stockholm, Sweden, August 20-24.2003
  2006
  • Managed Competition in Supply Relations: An Application of the Asset Ownership Approach” at Mid-West Economic Theory Meeting, April 28-30, Michigan State, USA.
  • "Non-Integration, Integration, and the Decentralized Firm: Management of Externalities vs. Private Benefits" at Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting, Beijing, July 10-12.
  • “Monotonicity of Optimal Solutions, Turnpike Property, and Existence of Forecast Horizon in a Dynamic Model of Hold up” at Econometric Society European Meeting, Austria, Vienna, August 24-28.
  2007
  • Collusion in Organizations and Management of Conflicts through Job Design and Authority Delegation ”at the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET07), July 6-8, Vanderbilt, USA.
  • “Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup”at the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET07), July 6-8, Vanderbilt, USA.
  • “Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup” at Econometric Society Far Eastern Meeting, Taipei, Taiwan, July 11-13
 2008
  • “Monotonicity, Equilibrium Incentives, and Efficiency in a Dynamic Model of Holdup”at the conference of the Society for Economic Design (SED), Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 15-17, 2008
  • "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," at the Association for Public Economic Theory (PET08), June 27-29, Seoul, Korea. (This is a longer version of the paper with the same title published in Economics Bulletin 2008)
 2009
  • "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design" at the 1st Annual UECE Lisbon Meetings: Game Theory and Applications, November 5-7, Lisbon, Portugal.
 2010
  • "Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 12-16
 2011
  • "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Pao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis of Development Governance",at 16th World Congress of the International Economic Association, July 5, 2011,Tsinghua University, Beijing
  • "A Contract Theory Approach to Centralization, Decentralization and the Incentive Problem in the European Union (EU), with a focus on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Euro Zone Financial Governance" at 16th World Congress of the International Economic Association, July 8, 2011,Tsinghua University, Beijing
2012
  • "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework" at International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, New York, July 15-19
  • "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at the international conference for “Institutions, Economic Growth and International Trade”, China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University, China, September 7th to 9th.
  • "Fiscal Relations between the Central and Local Governments in China and the Concepts of "包(Bao) Contract" and "比賽(Bisai) Contest": A Contract Theory Analysis,at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2012), Delhi, India, Decemberr 20th to 22th.
2013
  •  "Hierarchical Global Pollution Control in Asymmetric Information Environments: A Continuous-type, Three-tier Agency Framework" at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2013), Singapore, August 2-4.
== Due to the job of the Executive Committee (Dean of the Graduate School of Economics, Dean of the Economic Department, etc.), I had stopped international travels for international conferences for a while. ==

2023
  •  “Controlled Competition”: Dynamic Tournaments as Economic Development Strategy: A Viewpoint from Incentive Design, at Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES 2023), Singapore, July 28-30.
  • “Controlled Competition”: Dynamic Tournaments as Economic Development Strategy: A Viewpoint from Incentive Design, at Econometric Society European Meeting (ESEM 2023), Barcelona, August 28-31.
  • “Controlled Competition”: Dynamic Tournaments as Economic Development Strategy: A Viewpoint from Incentive Design, at 20th World Congress of the International Economic Association 2023, Colombia, Medellin, December 11-15. * This was the second time for me to attend the World Congress of the International Economic Association, following Beijing (Tsinghua University) in 2011, and I found it a stimulating experience different from attending the conferences at the Econometric Society

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